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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Curtis Jackson appeals from the judgment of conviction, alleging that the district
court erroneously denied his motion to strike a biased juror for cause. That error was
not harmless because, despite Mr. Jackson's use of all his allotted peremptory strikes,
two of the jurors who sat on his case were not impartial.
The State miscomprehends Mr. Jackson's argument on appeal, believing it to be
a challenge to the two jurors who sat on this case in a claim of fundamental error. That
is not the case. The fact that two other jurors, whose biases are clear from the record
and who did not unequivocally affirm their ability to be impartial in light of those biases,
remained on the panel simply demonstrates that error in not removing Juror #34 for
cause was not harmless. There is no independent challenge to their presence on the
panel. As such, the only need for an analysis pursuant to Perry1 is to reveal and rely on
the biases of Juror #54 and Juror #57, as they were not challenged below. It does not,
however, make the entire claim one of fundamental error. The issue Mr. Jackson raised
in this appeal was preserved by his motion to strike Juror #34. As a result of the State's
misunderstanding of the argument on appeal, its arguments apply the wrong legal
standards and rules to the issues.
Additionally, the State contends that neither the juror Mr. Jackson sought to
strike, nor the two who remained on the panel, were biased.

However, questions

remained as to the impartiality of each, since none gave unequivocal affirmations of
their ability to remain entirely impartial. In fact, Juror #34 did not offer any affirmation of

1

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226 (2010).

1

impartiality at all in regard to her expressed predisposition to believe the alleged victim
over Mr. Jackson and did not provide any affirmation of impartiality in that regard at all.
When such questions as to a juror's impartiality exist, they are to be resolved in favor of
the defendant. As such, because the district court's erroneous decision to not dismiss
Juror #34 for cause was not harmless, this Court should vacate his conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.
Mr. Jackson also contends that the district court erroneously denied his Rule 35
motion without appointing him counsel. The State's first contention is that the denial of
Mr. Jackson's request for counsel was not erroneous simply because his submission
was not notarized.

The State's position is belied by case law, as well as a recent

amendment to the relevant statute, which would now simply presume Mr. Jackson to be
indigent. All this recognizes that the law is aimed at increasing access to counsel for
indigent defendants. As such, substance trumps form in such filings, and the State's
position holding form over substance, despite Mr. Jackson's explanation for the
deficiencies (his inability, due to no fault of his own, to meet the form requirements and
still timely file the motion). The information that Mr. Jackson provided should have been
sufficient to merit the appointment of counsel to assist him in pursuing his Rule 35
motion.
The State also contends that the denial of counsel in the Rule 35 proceedings
should stand because the motion was frivolous and was not accompanied by new or
additional information.

That assertion is flawed, however, since one of the reasons

counsel should be appointed is to help the defendant marshal this sort of evidence and
present it to the district court. As such, the question of whether counsel should have

2

been appointed should be addressed before a decision on the merits of the motion is
reached. Furthermore, Mr. Jackson did provide new and additional information that was
not presented during his trial and which should not have been presumed to have been
considered by the district court. As such, this Court should, at least, remand this case
so that Mr. Jackson may pursue his Rule 35 motion with the assistance of counsel.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Jackson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

3

ISSUES IN REPLY
1.

Whether the State has misunderstood the issue regarding the biased jury now on
appeal, and it has applied the wrong legal standards as a result.

2.

Whether the State incorrectly asserted that the district court's decision to not
dismiss Juror #34 for cause was appropriate because Juror #34 did not give an
unequivocal affirmation that she could be impartial.

3.

Whether the State incorrectly asserted that the district court's decision to not
dismiss Juror #34 for cause was harmless because Juror #54 and Juror #57 did
not give unequivocal affirmations that they could be impartial.

4.

Whether the State incorrectly asserted that Mr. Jackson's filings were insufficient
to merit the appointment of counsel on his Rule 35 motion.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The State Has Misunderstood The Issue Regarding The Biased Jury Now On Appeal,
And It Has Applied The Wrong Legal Standards As A Result
A.

Introduction
The State has apparently misunderstood Mr. Jackson's argument on appeal,

and in so doing, applied the wrong legal standards and rules to this case.

First and

foremost, the issue on appeal addressing the biased jury only contends that the district
court erroneously refused to dismiss Juror #34 for cause, not, as the State believes, a
new challenge to Juror #54 and Juror #57. Therefore, the State's application of the
fundamental error doctrine is misplaced.

This issue was preserved for appeal by

Mr. Jackson's motion to remove Juror #34 for cause, which was denied. Rather, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that such errors are subject to harmless error analysis.
Second, in cases such as this, the harmless error analysis only asks whether
there were biased jurors on the panel. The State's argument - that defense counsel's
decisions as to the exercise of Mr. Jackson's peremptory strikes are tactical, and thus,
not reviewable on appeal - is also mistaken. According to the United States Supreme
Court and Idaho Supreme Court, it does not matter how those jurors came to be on the
panel. The question in that regard is simply "Were any of the jurors biased." If there is
a biased juror on the panel, the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated and
the error is not harmless.

As such, the manner in which the defense exercised its

peremptory strikes is not relevant and does not prevent review of this issue.
Finally, in arguing that the three jurors in question had offered sufficient
assertions of impartiality to overcome their stated biases, the State contends that there
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should be a presumption of impartiality once such an assertion is made.

Far from

supporting the State's contention, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held to the
contrary, finding that such affirmations are "not always dispositive" on the question of
whether a juror is impermissibly biased. Therefore, there cannot be a presumption of
impartiality; rather, the jurors' responses are subject to review to determine whether
they failed to unequivocally assure the court that they could set aside their biases and
decide the case with entire impartiality. Any question that remains as to the impartiality
of a potential juror is to be resolved in the defendant's favor. After all, as the Court of
Appeals has observed, the worst possible outcome erring in the defendant's favor is
that one unbiased juror will be replaced by another unbiased juror, whereas, not doing
so risks depriving the defendant of his constitutional rights. State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho
603, 610 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting People v. Johnson, 730 N.E.2d 932, 941

(N.Y. 2000)).

B.

This Argument Was Preserved For Appeal And Is Subject To Harmless Error
Analysis
The Idaho and United States Supreme Courts have clearly established that the

defendant has a claim on appeal when the district court erroneously denies his motion
to remove a biased juror for cause.

Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-89 (1988)

(recognizing that the ultimate goal is to select an impartial jury, and only if the jury that
sits is not impartial will there be a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights);

State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 570 (1991) (affirming Idaho's use of the Ross
framework); see a/so Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353-54 (2011) (reaffirming
Ramos). When the complained-of juror (in this case, Juror #34) was removed via a
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peremptory strike, the erroneous denial of the motion to remove the juror for cause is
reviewed pursuant to a harmless error analysis.

Id.

Specifically, the appellate court

assesses whether the jurors who actually deliberated in the case were impartial. Id. If
they were not, then the error was not harmless and conviction vacated. Id.
The State believes that Mr. Jackson is asserting a separate error in seating Juror
#54 and Juror #57. (See Resp. Br., p.13 ("[Mr.] Jackson has failed to demonstrate from
the record that either Juror #54 or Juror #57 were biased against him, and, as such, has
failed to establish that the seating of those jurors violated his constitutional right to an
impartial jury.") (emphasis added).)

That belief is erroneous; Mr. Jackson is not

challenging the seating of Juror #54 or Juror #57. Rather, he has contended that the
mere fact that those jurors were on the panel and that they had expressed biases
against Mr. Jackson demonstrates that the denial of Mr. Jackson's motion to remove
Juror #34 for cause was not a harmless violation of his rights. See Ross, 487 U.S. at
85-89; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570. This is a critical
distinction which affects the applicable legal rules and standards, and so the distinction
must be given effect.
Pursuant to its erroneous belief in that regard, the State argued this case under a
fundamental error framework.

(See, e.g., Resp. Br., p.15 ("[Mr.] Jackson's claim of

prejudice and, ultimately, his claim of fundamental error under Perry, necessarily fail").)
However, since this issue is preserved and subject to harmless error analysis, those
arguments are inapplicable to the issue on appeal.

See Ross, 487 U.S. at 85-89;

Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570; see a/so Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54. Perry's
fundamental error test, see Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, applies only insofar as its
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standards guide the determination of whether the fact that Juror #54 and Juror #57 were
biased may be argued for the first time on appeal. While the particular question of their
bias was not argued below, it is necessarily argued on appeal as part of the preserved
challenge to the denied motion to strike Juror #34 for cause.

See, e.g., Nightengale,

151 Idaho at 353-54; see a/so State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 862 (Ct. App. 2009)
(determining Mr. Adams's claim to not be preserved for appeal, distinguishing that case
from Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, "because in Hauser, defense counsel moved to excuse
the juror for cause, thereby preserving the issue for appeal," whereas Mr. Adams had
made no such challenge).
Therefore, Perry is only applicable insofar as determining whether Juror #54 and
Juror #57's bias impacted an unwaived constitutional right, was clear from the record,
and was prejudicial to Mr. Jackson. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If so, then their bias
may be argued for the first time on appeal. See id. The presence of a biased juror on
the panel deprives the defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a full
jury of twelve impartial and unprejudiced jurors.

See, e.g., Ross, 487 U.S. at 85;

Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1966).

Mr. Jackson did not waive those

rights.

(See generally R.)

Therefore, the first prong of the Perry analysis is met

once Mr. Jackson demonstrates that one of the jurors who sat on his case was, in fact,
biased.

Similarly, there is a reasonable possibility that a biased juror will decide the

case according to her biases instead of on the governing law and evidence presented.

See Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. All the defendant need show under the third prong of
Perry is "a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial."
State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 472 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 226)
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(emphasis in original). Therefore, the presence of a biased juror also demonstrates the
prejudice. As such, if Mr. Jackson demonstrates that the bias of the two jurors who sat
on his case is clear from the face of the record, the Perry standards allow that bias to be
argued for the first time on appeal, in this case, to demonstrate that the decision to not
remove a biased juror for cause was not harmless.
Furthermore, once the defendant establishes that there was an error, the burden
shifts and the State must demonstrate that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); State v. Joy, _

P.3d _ , 2013

Opinion No. 78, p.12 (2013). Id. at 12-13. As such, the State bears the burden to prove
that none of the jurors on the panel were biased. See Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 35354; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570.

It cannot meet that standard without bringing the

question of Juror #54 and Juror #57's bias before this Court. And since questions about
juror bias are resolved in favor of the defendant, see Hauser, 143 Idaho at 611, a
decision to not review those jurors for bias is essentially a conclusion that the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the error in this matter was harmless.
See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24) ("where a
constitutional violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection,
a reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."') (emphasis in original);
As a result, Mr. Jackson would be entitled to a new trial.

Cf State v. Almaraz, 154

Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden to show the
error was harmless and remanding the case for a new trial).

9

C.

The Manner In Which Mr. Jackson Exercised His Peremptory Strikes Is Irrelevant
To The Issue On Appeal
In this case, the analysis under the harmless error test only addresses whether

Juror #54 or Juror #57 was biased. See Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119
Idaho at 570. However, the State erroneously contends that since defense counsel did
not strike those jurors with a peremptory challenge, that was a strategic choice which
bars consideration of the question on appeal.

(See Resp. Br., pp.13-15.)

That

argument is erroneous. The United States Supreme Court made this issue clear: if one
of the jurors on the panel is shown to have been biased and the defendant used all his
peremptory challenges, then the biased juror was forced on the defendant in violation of
his constitutional rights. Ross, 487 U.S. at 89. The presumption that logically follows
from the requirement established in Ross - to exhaust the peremptory strikes in order to
raise this type of challenge - is that defense counsel will be exercising the peremptory
challenges to remove other jurors who the defense team believes are also biased. The
only logical conclusion from this prerequisite, then, is that the way in which the
peremptory challenges were exercised is not relevant. Adopting the State's perspective
would mean that fulfilling the prerequisite required by the United States Supreme
Court - exercising all the allotted peremptory challenges - would prevent the review
that the Supreme Court intended to allow. See id.
That is not to say, the general rule is not that the defense's choices regarding
challenges to jurors are tactical and not questioned on review.

See,

e.g.,

State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court

has decided that the general rule is not applicable in this particular scenario - where the
defense actually does challenge a juror for cause, and that motion is erroneously
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denied.

See Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570 (citing Ross, 487 U.S. at 89); see a/so

Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54 (reaffirming Ramos).

Since Mr. Jackson did

challenge a juror for cause, that motion was erroneously denied, and he used all his
allotted peremptory challenges, his case falls into the special category of cases
identified in Ross and Ramos. As such, the State's contention regarding the tactical
choices in the use of the peremptory challenges is inapplicable to this appeal.

D.

The State Erroneously Argued For A Presumption Of Impartiality In Jurors Who
Had Expressed Bias And Offered An Affirmation Of Impartiality
When jurors admit bias, they may, upon further voir dire, also make an assertion

of impartiality.

See, e.g., Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11.

The State contends that

"[u]nless a prospective juror indicates an inability to 'lay aside his impression or opinion
and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court,' it is presumed the
prospective juror is impartial." (Resp. Br., p.4 (emphasis added).) However, the Idaho
Supreme Court has consistently held to the contrary: such affirmations are "not always
dispositive" in resolving questions of juror bias. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70
(2011 ); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 688 (2004); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,
506 (1999). They definitely do not, as the State contends, establish a presumption that
the juror can be impartial. See id.
Certainly, the district court is entitled to rely on such affirmations in determining
whether it would be appropriate for that particular juror to serve, but such an affirmation
does not necessarily end the inquiry. See id. Rather, the juror's affirmation needs to be
unequivocal and demonstrate the potential juror's ability to act with entire impartiality.
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610.

While an affirmation by the juror could be sufficient to
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reach that conclusion, such is not always the case.

Some affirmations may not be

unequivocal or may not demonstrate an ability to "act with entire impartiality . . .. "
See, e.g., Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11 (determining that the juror's affirmation that he

would "try" to be impartial was insufficient to justify the court's decision to not excuse
him for cause) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, if there are questions as to a juror's
impartiality, they are to be resolved in the defendant's favor.

Id.

Therefore, there

cannot be, as the State contends, a presumption of impartiality once a potential juror
who has expressed a bias offers an affirmation of impartiality.

II.

The State Incorrectly Asserted That The District Court's Decision To Not Dismiss
Juror #34 For Cause Was Appropriate Because Juror #34 Did Not Give An Unequivocal
Affirmation That She Could Be Impartial

A

Introduction
Juror #34 expressed two different forms of bias: her predisposition to believe the

alleged victim's version of events over Mr. Jackson's (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.14 - p.108,
L.2), and her willingness to vote to convict Mr. Jackson even if the State had not proved
its case beyond a reasonable doubt because of the nature of the charged offense.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.16 - p.130, L.14.)

The State contends that Juror #34 offered

sufficient affirmations of impartiality, thereby justifying the district court's decision to
deny Mr. Jackson's motion to dismiss Juror #34 for cause. 2 (Resp. Br., pp.4-9.) It is

Juror #33, who harbored the same biases as Juror #34, was dismissed for cause.
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.24 - p.108, L.5; Tr., Vol.1, p.118, L.25 - p.119, L.18.) The
difference between the two is that the prosecutor objected to the motion to strike
Juror #34, and did not object to the motion to strike Juror #33. (Tr., Vol.1, p.119,
Ls.15-16.)
2
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mistaken because Juror #34 did not offer any assertion of impartiality in regard to her
predisposition to believe the alleged victim over Mr. Jackson and her assertion of
impartiality in regard to the State's burden of proof was not unequivocal.

B.

Juror #34 Did Not Offer Any Assertions Of Impartiality In Regard To Her Stated
Predisposition To Believe The Alleged Victim Over Mr. Jackson
The State contends that the questioning, memorialized in the transcript at

Tr., Vol.1, p.131, L.18 - p.132, L.2, constitutes an affirmation of impartiality in regard to
Juror #34's expressed bias as to which witness she was going to believe.

(Resp.

Br., p.8 n.2.) That is not the case, since that section of the transcript only addresses
Juror #34's view on the State's burden of proof:

[Prosecutor]: ... But you do understand that I have the
burden. I have to show that he's guilty.

A Right.
[Prosecutor]: And if I don't do that, you have to vote not
guilty.

A Right.
[Prosecutor]: That's your duty.

A (JUROR NODS HEAD AFFIRMATIVELY.)
[Prosecutor]: Right? A Right.
[Prosecutor]: And you can do that.

A Yes.
[Prosecutor]: Thank you. Do you feel like you could be
fair and impartial in this case if it came down to a close
question?

A Yes.

13

(Tr., Vol.1, p.131, L.18 - p.132, L.2 (emphasis added).) These comments immediately
follow Juror #34's assertion that she would vote to convict Mr. Jackson even if the State
failed to meet the burden of proof because of the nature of the case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.128,
L.17 - p.129, L.8.) These comments are also separated from Juror #34's comments as
to which witness she would believe by a significant period of time and discussion with
other jurors. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.108, L.3- p.126, L.19.) In fact, the prosecutor
had questioned Juror #34 during that interval and did not secure an affirmation of
impartiality in regard to the juror's bias to believe the alleged victim at that time.
(SeeTr., Vol.1, p.116, L.19 - p.118, L.14)

As such, there is no logical connection

linking the answers quoted above with Juror #34's expression of bias to believe the
alleged victim, absent a specific reference to those prior comments by either of the
speakers. Therefore, understood in context, this affirmation only speaks to one of Juror
#34's biases: if the question of whether the State has met its burden is close, would
Juror#34beabletoremainfairand impartial. (See Tr., Vol.128, L.17-p.132, L.12.)
At no point after Juror #34 asserted, "I think with the nature of this case if it's
purely his word against hers and that's it, then I would - yeah, I would believe the little
girl over a grown man,"3 (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.24 - p.108, L.2), did she retract that

Contrast Juror #34's response with the very specific affirmation of impartiality that
Juror #57 gave to that same question: "No. I would say not. I've also had firsthand
experience with a child who wasn't honest about something like that so I've experienced
both sides of that so that is the reason why I believe I could be impartial because I'm
open to listening to both sides of that." (Tr., Vol.1, p.72, Ls.11-16.) Juror #57's
statement is an unequivocal assertion of impartiality in that regard, which would allay
concerns about whether she could be impartial on that point. Hauser, 143 Idaho at 61 0
(requiring this type of assurance when assessing juror bias). Juror #34 gave no
such affirmation. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.116, L.19 - p.118, L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.126,
L.20 - p.132, L.17.)
3

14

statement or affirm that she could lay that bias aside. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.116,
L.19 - p.118, L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.126, L.20 - p.132, L.17.) The case law in this regard is
clear: when the juror in question "was never asked to make, and did not make that
commitment" to set aside a particular bias and decide the case only on the evidence
presented, the decision to not excuse that juror for cause is erroneous. Hauser, 143
Idaho at 611. Therefore, since Juror #34 did not offer an affirmation of impartiality in
regard to her predisposition to believe the alleged victim over Mr. Jackson, she was
biased and should have been removed for cause. See id.; compare Nightengale, 151
Idaho at 353-54 (holding that, where the juror in question offered a specific, unequivocal
affirmation of impartiality, the district court did not err by denying a motion to strike the
juror for cause).

C.

Juror #34's Affirmation Of Impartiality In Regard To Her Bias In Regard To The
State's Burden Of Proof Was Not Unequivocal
Notably, Juror #34 reiterated her bias regarding her inability to hold the State to

its burden of proof after offering an affirmation of impartiality in that regard. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.117, L.22 - p.118, L.10 (Juror #34's initial affirmation of an ability to hold the State to
its burden); Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.8 (Juror #34 indicating she would be willing
to vote to convict even if not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of Mr. Jackson's
guilt); Tr., Vol.1, p.131, L.18 - p.132, L.12 (Juror #34's second affirmation of an ability to
set aside that bias).)

Contrary to the State's assertions, (see, e.g., Resp. Br., p.9),

this waffling on whether or not she could be impartial and hold the State to its
burden of proof reveals that Juror #34's affirmations were not unequivocal and failed to
demonstrate that she could lay aside her bias and deliberate with "entire impartiality."
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Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610 (emphasis in original). In fact, Juror #34 expressly qualified

her affirmation in this regard, when, in response to the prosecutor's attempt at
rehabilitating her, she stated: "I'd like to say that I could follow that oath but with what
[defense counsel] was proposing, if that were to happen, / don't know if -- if I would be
able to just keep that beyond a reasonable doubt concrete mind set." (Tr., Vol.1, p.130,

Ls.10-14 (emphasis added).)4
The scenario defense counsel presented to Juror #34, the scenario upon which
she qualified her affirmation of impartiality, was:
If you were afraid [Mr. Jackson] did this but you don't think [the
prosecution proved it, would you find him guilty anyway? ... [M]aybe your
job would be to make up the difference ... If they gave you enough to
hang your hat on, even if they didn't really prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, just to make sure, just to make sure, that he doesn't get away with
it.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.6.) Juror #34's response was "Yeah. I -- you know
just because of the nature of this case."5 (Tr., Vol.1, p.129, Ls.7-8.) This is the point
that Juror #34 explicitly told the prosecutor that she could not unequivocally disavow.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.10-14.) Because Juror #34 did not unequivocally affirm that she
could set aside that bias and be impartial, the district court's failure to remove her for
cause was erroneous. See Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610. Therefore, since Juror #34 had
expressed bias toward Mr. Jackson and did not give an unequivocal affirmation that she

Upon reviewing the transcripts, the State is correct that this statement was made in
response to a question posited to Juror #34 by the prosecutor. Mr. Jackson apologizes
for his misstatement in that regard in the Appellant's Brief.
5 The inference from the context of this statement is that Juror #34 was affirming that
she would find Mr. Jackson guilty even if the State had not proved his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt simply because of the nature of the charges against him. (See
Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.8.)
4
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could set that bias aside and be entirely impartial, the district court's decision to deny
Mr. Jackson's motion to strike her for cause was erroneous. See id.

111.
The State Incorrectly Asserted That The District Court's Decision To Not Dismiss
Juror #34 For Cause Was Harmless Because Juror #54 And Juror #57 Did Not Give
Unequivocal Affirmations That They Could Be Impartial

A.

Introduction
The State contends that the, because Juror #54 and Juror #57 made affirmations

of impartiality, there is no clear indication of bias on the record, and implicitly, that the
district court's error in refusing to remove Juror #34 for cause was harmless.
Resp. Br., pp.9-15.)

(See

However, neither Juror #54 nor Juror #57 made unequivocal

affirmations of impartiality such that they would be able to set aside their expressed
biases and decide the case with "entire impartiality." Compare Hauser, 143 Idaho at
610-11. The State must prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman,
386 U.S. at 24; Joy, 2013 Opinion No. 78 at p.12. Additionally, questions remaining as
to the juror's ability to remain fair and impartial are resolved in the defendant's favor.
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. As a result, the equivocal nature of Juror #54 and Juror

#57's affirmations leaves questions as to their ability to remain impartial means that the
State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in not
removing Juror #34 for cause was harmless.

B.

Juror #57 Did Not Offer An Unequivocal Affirmation Of Impartiality
Juror #57 told the district court "I believe I can be impartial; however, I guess my

worry would be that you know in this full swing of trial, I don't know how I would feel
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later."

(Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.14-19.)

Subsequently, in response to the prosecutor's

question, inquiring as to whether she felt able to maintain her composure during the
trial, she reaffirmed the qualification: "Gosh, I don't know that I could say that without
have had an experience. But I believe I could just as -- but as a mom, period, it would
be difficult." (Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.13-19.) The State contends that, because Juror #57
"indicated a belief that she would be able to 'hold [her] emotions in check' ([Tr., Vol1.],
p.71, Ls.1-22); that she would '[a]bsolutely' 'listen to all the testimony, [and] see the
evidence before [she] made any type of decision' ([Tr., Vol1.], p.71, L.23 - p.72, L.5),"
she had made an unequivocal affirmation of impartiality. (Resp. Br., p.12.) That is not
the case, since those statements do not indicate that Juror #57 would be able to set
aside her emotions, as opposed to just try to set them aside, and thus, do not
unequivocally indicate that she would be entirely impartial.
Juror #57's response is similar to the response given in Hauser, which the Court
of Appeals determined was insufficient to allay the concerns of bias. See Hauser, 143
Idaho at 610-11. The juror in question in Hauser "agreed to try to be fair, but when
asked to endorse the idea that everything a police officer says is not necessarily true,
[the juror] declined . . . . The voir dire produced no assurance that the juror would lay
aside his prejudices and render an impartial verdict." Id. (emphasis added). As a result
of the juror's failure to assure the district court that he could lay aside his prejudices, the
Court of Appeals concluded:

"In our view, when a juror admits bias, and gives no

unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several efforts by the court
or counsel to elicit such an assurance, an inference that he will not act with entire
impartiality becomes inescapable" and that juror is impermissibly biased. Id. (emphasis
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in original). Similarly, Juror #57 offered no unequivocal assurance that she would lay
aside her bias, despite the efforts of the prosecutor in voir dire.

(See generally

Tr., Vol.1, p.70, L.6 - p.73, L.18.)
Rather, Juror #57 indicated only that she believed she could keep her emotions
in check (i.e., that she would try to be fair). (See Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.1-22.) That, as the
Hauser Court made clear, does not constitute an unequivocal affirmation of impartiality.
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11.

Additionally, Juror #57's promise to listen to all the

evidence before making a decision does not speak to Juror #57's concerns that her
emotions would not factor into her decision. 6

Furthermore, Juror #57 expressly

qualified her affirmations of impartiality: (See Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.13-19 ("I don't know
that I could say that .... ").)7 Precedent is clear, that when a juror declines to give an
unequivocal affirmation of impartiality, "an inference that he will not act with entire
impartiality becomes inescapable." Hauser, 143 Idaho at 611. Since there is still an
inference that Juror #57 could not have set aside her emotions and deicide the case
only on the applicable law and the evidence presented, and since such questions are to
be resolved in favor of the defendant, the State has failed to prove that Juror #57 was
not an impermissibly-biased member of Mr. Jackson's jury panel.

See Hauser, 143

Idaho at 610-11. As such, it failed to prove that the district court's erroneous decision to

It is improper for the jury to decide a case based on emotion, rather than the
applicable law and evidence presented. Cf. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 480
(2012) (it is misconduct for a prosecutor to appeal for a decision based on any factor
other than the applicable law and the evidence presented); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho
82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (it is misconduct to urge a verdict to be reached on emotion,
~assion, or prejudice).
This qualification of the affirmation is clear from the record, which means her bias may
be argued for the first time on appeal. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
6
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not remove Juror #34 for cause was not harmless, and the case should be remanded
for a new trial. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Joy, 2013 Opinion No. 78 at p.12.

C.

Juror #54 Did Not Offer An Unequivocal Affirmation Of Impartiality
Juror #54 responded to the prosecutor's question regarding the familial

relationship between the prosecutor and the juror's family and whether it would "sway
[her] in any sense." (Tr., Vol.1, p.76, L.9 - p.77, L.7.) The juror's response was not
unequivocal: "It might." (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, L.8.) And while, as the State pointed out,
Juror #54 did answer the question "And do you think that you could be fair to
Mr. Jackson" in the affirmative, there was no indication that she would set aside the bias
she had identified. 8 Compare Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. Without that affirmation,
there remains a concern that the juror is biased, and thus, the juror inappropriately sat
on the case. See Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. Therefore, the State has failed to prove
that Juror #54 was not an impermissibly-biased member of Mr. Jackson's jury panel.
See id. As a result it failed to prove that the district court's erroneous decision to not

remove Juror #34 for cause was not harmless, and the case should be remanded for a
new trial. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Joy, 2013 Opinion No. 78 at p.12.

Contrast Juror #54's responses with the affirmation Juror #57 gave in regard to her
ability to listen to both parties' witnesses. (Tr., Vol.1, p.72, Ls.11-16 ("No. I would say
not. I've also had firsthand experience with a child who wasn't honest about something
like that so I've experienced both sides of that so that is the reason why I believe I could
be impartial because I'm open to listening to both sides of that.").) Juror #57's
statement would be an unequivocal affirmation of impartiality on the issue addressed;
Juror #54's statement, "It might," is not. That qualification, and thus, Juror #54's bias, is
clear from the record, which means her bias may be argued for the first time on appeal.
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
8
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IV.
The State Incorrectly Asserted That Mr. Jackson's Filings Were Insufficient To Merit The
Appointment Of Counsel On His Rule 35 Motion
The State does not take issue with Mr. Jackson's assertions that the Rule 35
proceedings are a critical stage of the criminal prosecution process or that Mr. Jackson
would be entitled to the assistance of counsel upon demonstrating his indigency. (See

generally Resp. Br., pp.15-24.) Rather, it takes issue with the information Mr. Jackson
presented, asserting it is insufficient to merit a finding of indigency pursuant to I.C. § 19854.9 (Resp. Br., pp.15-24.) However, Mr. Jackson did provide a completed affidavit
form (though not notarized) to the court, asserting that he had no bank accounts,
assets, or other forms of security.

(R., p.192.)

Mr. Jackson also provided a letter

explaining why the affidavit was not notarized (he had been placed in protective custody
after he was attacked by other inmates and believed he was unable to arrange a
meeting with the notary public before the time to file his Rule 35 motion elapsed).
(Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis filed December 7, 2011 (attached to the
record as a Miscellaneous Exhibit).)

9 It should be noted that I.C. § 19-854 was recently amended and now provides a
presumption that persons in the same situation Mr. Jackson was when he made this
request are indigent. See I.C. § 19-854(2)(c), as amended July 1, 2013. Mr. Jackson
does not claim that the presumption should apply to his case, but it does indicate that
the intent of the statute was to increase access to legal counsel for indigent persons,
not, as the State suggests (see Resp. Br., pp.15-24) inhibit it on purely procedural
bases. See, e.g., State v. Elisondo, 114 Idaho 412, 425 (1988) ("The mandate of the
statute is clear: the public defender should not be kept at bay until a formal indigency
hearing has been held pursuant to I.C. § 19-854. A public defender should be allowed,
nay, encouraged, to interview indigents who have requested counsel prior to any court
appearance or formal indigency hearing.") (emphasis in italics from original; emphasis
in bold added).
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This letter demonstrates that Mr. Jackson was not only making efforts to file a
complete set of documents with his motion, but that he was also aware with the
restrictions placed on such motions, and that he was making his best efforts to conform
with both requirements.

Coincidentally, this situation is one of the reasons why the

district courts are encouraged to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. Because "few
indigents can marshal the evidence of mitigating circumstances necessary to win a
reduction of sentence," they should be afforded the guidance and assistance of counsel
at such times. United States v. Morales, 498 F.Supp. 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); see

Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 923 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992); cf. Charboneau v. State, 140
Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001)) (when
addressing the question of appointing counsel in post-conviction, "the trial court should
keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be
conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim."

To prevent the

erroneous dismissal of actions in such cases, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
question of appointing counsel should be resolved before ruling on the merits of the
claim). Ultimately, however, Mr. Jackson had, at least, made assertions of his indigency
to the district court.
Furthermore, the district court actually recognized that Mr. Jackson had no
assets with which to proceed on his own: "The Court considers Mr. Jackson indigent for
the purposes of an appeal where the legal fees would be thousands of dollars and

Mr. Jackson has no income." (R., p.193 (emphasis added).) As the defendant's income
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is the first factor listed for the district court to consider in regard to indigency, it seems
as though the district court did consider the likelihood that Mr. Jackson was, in fact,
indigent. However, it asserted: "For a Rule 35 motion, however, Mr. Jackson may have
sufficient resources to pay for private counsel." (R., p.193 (emphasis added).) This
assertion does not constitute a finding that Mr. Jackson was not indigent, but an
assertion that there was insufficient evidence to make such a determination.
The State argues that this was a sufficient basis to deny the request for counsel.
(See Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) It relies on Quinlivan v. State, 94 Idaho 334 (1971). In that
case, the district court's decision to deny the request for counsel were deemed
appropriate after it had held a hearing and inquired into Mr. Quinlivan's financial
situation. See Quinlivan, 94 Idaho at 334-35. The district court in Mr. Jackson's case
only determined it had insufficient information to determine whether Mr. Jackson was, in
fact, indigent. Therefore, it could have, at the very least, held a hearing such as was
held in Quinlivan to gather sufficient evidence to make its determination. As such, it
erroneously denied his request for an attorney, or should have at least requested more
information on this point so that it could actually determine whether Mr. Jackson was
indigent for purposes of the Rule 35 motion. However, the record as it is only indicates
that Mr. Jackson was indigent and the district court was depriving him of his right to
counsel because of an imperfect filing.
Additionally, by denying Mr. Jackson's request because of the imperfect filing,
particularly in light of Mr. Jackson's explanation for the incomplete nature of his filing,
the district court is elevating form over substance, behavior which both the Idaho
Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have criticized. See, e.g., In re Weick, 142

23

Idaho 275, 279 (2005) (the Idaho courts "will not exalt form over substance");
Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 652, 655 (Ct. App. 2008).

In fact, when it comes to post-

judgment pleadings, like a Rule 35 motion, filed by incarcerated defendants, like
Mr. Jackson, the rule is clear: "Idaho appellate courts have long held that, with respect
to post-judgment pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance governs over
form."

Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2008)).

The substance of

Mr. Jackson's pleadings, accompanied as it was by an explanation of the incomplete
nature of the form, should have been sufficient to merit consideration on the merits of
his motion and request for counsel. See id. The district court's decision to deny him
that assistance violated Mr. Jackson's statutory and constitutional rights to assistance of
counsel. (See App. Br., pp.17-22.) Therefore, this case should, at least, be remanded
for a hearing on Mr. Jackson's Rule 35 motion after he has been afforded the
assistance of counsel.
The State also contends that decision to deny Mr. Jackson the aid of an attorney
should be upheld because the underlying motion was, by its account, frivolous. (See
Resp. Br, pp.24-26.)

First, since the point of having counsel is to help the indigent

defendant marshal such evidence for presentation to the court, see, e.g., Morales, 498
F.Supp. at 142; see also Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-94, the district court should
resolve the motion for counsel before ruling on the merits of the motion.

Cf, e.g.,

State v. Judd, 148 Idaho 22, 24-25 (Ct. App. 2009) (hold that "a district court presented
with a request for appointed counsel in a post-conviction action must address that
request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case and errs if it denies a petition
on the merits before ruling on the applicant's request for counsel."); see also
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Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-94 (holding the same so that counsel can help the
petitioner identify issues and present the necessary evidence in support of those issues,
whereas, the pro se defendant is usually unable to do so). Mr. Jackson indicated as
much to the district court: "I need help & more time." (R., p.191; see also Letter from
Defendant to Alexandria Lewis filed December 7, 2011 (defendant asserting he is
unable to get everything he wants to include with his motion together before the filing
deadline due to circumstances beyond his control).) As such, the State's argument that
a decision on the merits should justify the decision to deny counsel is misplaced.
Furthermore, Mr. Jackson did present new or additional evidence in support of
his motion: the diagnosis by "Dr. Puffer." (See Letter from defendant to Janet Meserve,
filed December 12, 2011, p.13, 2011, (attached to the record as a Miscellaneous
Exhibit).) The only time this information was presented was during the first trial, which
ended in a mistrial. See Letter from defendant to Janet Meserve, filed December 12,
2011, p.13, 2011, (attached to the record as a Miscellaneous Exhibit).) There is no
indication that information was considered at the sentencing hearing, nor should it be
assumed that it was considered at that time. The effect of a mistrial is to undo the trial
for some error, and thus, is generally given no effect. See, e.g., State v. Fairchild, 121
Idaho 960, 963 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)) ("The
general rule is that a defendant's motion for mistrial removes any bar by the double
jeopardy clause .... ") Thus, it should not be presumed that the district court did so
without a request by counsel that the district court take judicial notice of such facts from
the mistrial or an assertion by the district court that it had done so sua sponte. As such,
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the information in the letter to Janet Meserve constitutes new or additional information
presented in support of the Rule 35.
Therefore, the fact that the motion does not have all the information the State
would prefer to see in such filings is not, in and of itself, a reason to uphold the district
court's decision to deny Mr. Jackson's request for the assistance of counsel. Rather,
the State's arguments actually further demonstrate why counsel should have been
appointed. As a result, this Court should, at least, reverse the decision to deny the
request for counsel on the Rule 35 motion and remand for further proceedings on the
Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jackson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
remand his case for further proceedings.

Alternatively, he requests that the order

denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and the matter remanded for a hearing with the
assistance of an attorney.
DATED this 14th day of August, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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